Abstract. We study the Student-Project Allocation problem (SPA), a generalisation of the classical Hospitals / Residents problem (HR). An instance of SPA involves a set of students, projects and lecturers. Each project is offered by a unique lecturer, and both projects and lecturers have capacity constraints. Students have preferences over projects, whilst lecturers have preferences over students. We present an optimal lineartime algorithm for allocating students to projects, subject to these preferences and capacities. In particular, the algorithm finds a stable matching of students to projects. Here, the concept of stability generalises the stability definition in the HR context. The stable matching produced by our algorithm is simultaneously best-possible for all students. The SPA problem model that we consider is very general and has applications to a range of different contexts besides student-project allocation.
Introduction
In many university departments, students seek a project in a given field of speciality as part of the upper level of their degree programme. Usually, a project can be filled by at most one student, though in some cases a project is suitable for more than one student to work on simultaneously. To give students something of a choice, there should be as wide a range of available projects as possible, and in any case the total number of project places should not be less than the total number of students. Typically a lecturer will also offer a range of projects, but does not necessarily expect that all will be taken up.
Each student has preferences over the available projects that he/she finds acceptable, whilst a lecturer will normally have preferences over the students that he/she is willing to supervise. There may also be upper bounds on the number of students that can be assigned to a particular project, and the number of students that a given lecturer is willing to supervise. In this paper we consider the problem of allocating students to projects based on these preference lists and capacity constraints -the so-called Student-Project Allocation problem (SPA).
SPA is an example of a two-sided matching problem [10] , a large and very general class of problems in which the input set of participants can be partitioned into two disjoint sets A and B (in this case A is the set of students and B is the set of projects), and we seek to match members of A to members of B, i.e. to find a subset of A × B, subject to various criteria. These criteria usually involve capacity constraints, and/or preference lists, for example.
Both historical evidence (see e.g. [4, pp.3-4] , [7] ) and economic analysis [10] indicate that participants involved in two-sided matching problems should not be allowed to construct an allocation by approaching one another directly in order to make ad hoc arrangements. Instead, the allocation process should be automated by means of a centralised matching scheme. Moreover, it has been convincingly argued [9] that the key property that a matching constructed by such schemes should satisfy is stability. A formal definition of stability follows, but informally, a stable matching M guarantees that no two participants who are not matched together in M would rather be matched to one another than remain with their assignment in M . Such a pair of participants would form a private arrangement and would undermine the integrity of the matching.
The National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) [8] in the US is perhaps the largest and best-known example of a centralised matching scheme. It has been in operation since 1952, and currently handles the allocation of some 20,000 graduating medical students, or residents, to their first hospital posts, based on the preferences of residents over available hospital posts, and the preferences of hospital consultants over residents. The NRMP employs at its heart an efficient algorithm that essentially solves a variant of the classical Hospitals / Residents problem (HR) [3, 4] . The algorithm finds a stable matching of residents to hospitals that is resident-optimal, in that each resident obtains the best hospital that he/she could obtain in any stable matching.
There are many other examples of centralised matching schemes, both in educational and vocational contexts. Many university departments in particular seek to automate the allocation of students to projects. However, as we discuss in greater detail later, an optimal linear-time algorithm for this setting cannot be obtained by simply reducing an instance of SPA to an instance of HR. Thus, a specialised algorithm is required for the SPA problem.
In this paper we present a linear-time algorithm for finding a stable matching, given an instance of SPA. This algorithm is student-oriented, in that it finds a student-optimal stable matching. In this matching, each student obtains the best project that he/she could obtain in any stable matching. Our algorithm is applicable for any context that fits into the SPA model, for example where applicants seek posts at large organisations, each split into several departments.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, a formal definition of the SPA problem is given. Then, in Section 3, the algorithm for SPA is presented, together with correctness proofs and an analysis of its complexity. Finally, Section 4 contains some conclusions and open problems.
Definition of the Student-Project Allocation Problem
An instance of the Student-Project Allocation problem (SPA) may be defined as follows. Let S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n } be a set of students, let P = {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p m } be a set of projects, and let L = {l 1 , l 2 , . . . , l q } be a set of lecturers. Each student s i supplies a preference list, ranking a subset of P in strict order. If project p j appears on s i 's preference list, we say that s i finds p j acceptable. Denote by A i
Student preferences
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Project capacities:
Lecturer capacities: d1 = 3, d2 = 2, d3 = 2 the set of projects that s i finds acceptable. Each lecturer l k offers a non-empty set of projects P k , where P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P q partitions P . Let B k = {s i ∈ S : P k ∩ A i = ∅} (i.e. B k is the set of students who find acceptable a project offered by l k ). Lecturer l k supplies a preference list, denoted by L k , ranking B k in strict order. For any p j ∈ P k , we denote by L j k the projected preference list of l k for p j -this is obtained from L k by deleting those students who do not find p j acceptable. In this way, the ranking of L j k is inherited from L k . Also, l k has a capacity constraint d k , indicating the maximum number of students that he/she is willing to supervise. Similarly, each project p j carries a capacity constraint c j , indicating the maximum number of students that could be assigned to p j . We assume that max{c j :
An example SPA instance is shown in Figure 1 . Here the set of students is S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s 7 }, the set of projects is P = {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p 8 } and the set of lecturers is L = {l 1 , l 2 , l 3 }. Lecturers offer projects as indicated, and the preference lists and capacity constaints are also shown. As an example, the projected preference list of l 1 for p 1 comprises s 1 , s 3 , s 2 , s 5 , ranked in that order.
An assignment M is a subset of S × P such that:
If (s i , p j ) ∈ M , we say that s i is assigned to p j , and p j is assigned s i . Hence Condition 2 states that each student is assigned to at most one project in M . For notational convenience, if s i is assigned in M to p j , we may also say that s i is assigned to l k , and l k is assigned s i , where p j ∈ P k . For any student s i ∈ S, if s i is assigned in M to some project p j , we let M (s i ) denote p j ; otherwise we say that s i is unmatched in M . For any project p j ∈ P , we denote by M (p j ) the set of students assigned to p j in M . Project p j is under-subscribed, full or over-subscribed according as |M (p j )| is less than, equal to, or greater than c j , respectively. Similarly, for any lecturer l k ∈ L, we denote by M (l k ) the set of students assigned to l k in M . Lecturer l k is undersubscribed, full or over-subscribed according as |M (l k )| is less than, equal to, or greater than d k respectively.
A matching M is an assignment such that:
Hence Condition 3 stipulates that p j is assigned at most c j students in M , whilst Condition 4 requires that l k is assigned at most d k students in M . A blocking pair relative to a matching M is a (student,project) pair (s i , p j ) ∈ (S × P )\M such that:
In general we assume that s i prefers to be matched to an acceptable project rather than to remain unmatched. Hence Condition 2 indicates the means by which a student could improve relative to M . Suppose now that this condition is satisfied. To explain Condition 3(a), matching M cannot be stable if each of project p j and lecturer l k has a free place to take on s i (or to let s i change projects offered by l k ). We now consider Condition 3(b). If p j is under-subscribed, l k is full, and s i was not already matched in M to a project offered by l k , then l k cannot take on s i without first rejecting at least one student. Lecturer l k would only agree to this switch if he/she prefers s i to the worst student assigned to l k in M . In this case, project p j has room for s i . Alternatively, if s i was already matched in M to a project offered by l k , then the total number of students assigned to l k remains the same, and l k agrees to the switch since p j has room for s i . Finally, we consider Condition 3(c). If p j is full, then l k cannot take on s i without first rejecting at least one student assigned to p j . Lecturer l k would only agree to this switch if he/she prefers s i to the worst student assigned to p j in M . Notice that if s i was already matched in M to a project offered by l k , then the number of students assigned to l k would decrease by 1 after the switch. However we argue that this is the "correct" definition of a blocking pair in this case, also having the side-effects of avoiding issues of strategy and maintaining useful structural properties. For a full discussion of this point, we refer the reader to Section 4.1 of [1] .
We remark that HR is a special case of SPA in which m = q, c j = d j and P j = {p j } (1 ≤ j ≤ m). Essentially the projects and lecturers are indistinguishable in this case. In the HR setting, lecturers / projects are referred to as hospitals, and students are referred to as residents. Linear-time algorithms are known for finding a stable matching, given an instance of HR. The residentoriented algorithm [4, Section 1.6.3] finds a resident-optimal stable matching. In this stable matching, each matched resident is assigned to the best hospital that he/she could obtain in any stable matching, whilst each unmatched resident is unmatched in every stable matching. On the other hand, the hospital-oriented algorithm [4, Section 1.6.2] finds a hospital-optimal stable matching. In this stable matching, each full hospital is assigned the best set of residents that it could obtain in any stable matching, whilst each under-subscribed hospital is assigned the same set of residents in every stable matching.
It is worth drawing attention to a special case of HR (and hence of SPA). This is the classical Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists (SMI), where c j = 1 (1 ≤ j ≤ m) [3] , [4, Section 1.4.2] . In this setting, residents are referred to as men and hospitals are referred to as women. There exists a reduction from HR to SMI using the method of 'cloning' hospitals. That is, replace each hospital h j , of capacity c j , with c j women, denoted by h On the other hand there is no straightforward reduction involving cloning from an instance of SPA to an instance of HR, due to the projects and lecturers being distinct entities, each having capacity constraints. Even if such a reduction were possible, again it would typically increase the number of lecturers (hospitals) by a significant factor. This justifies the approach of this paper, in which we consider a direct algorithm for SPA.
The running time of our algorithm is O(L), where L is the total length of the input preference lists, and hence is linear in the size of the problem instance. This algorithm is optimal, since the Stable Marriage problem (SM) -the special case of SMI in which m = n and each student finds every project acceptableis a special case of SPA. A lower bound of Ω(L) is known for SM [6] , and hence this also applies to SPA.
3 The algorithm for SPA
Overview
The algorithm for finding a student-optimal stable matching involves a sequence of apply operations (i.e. students apply to projects). An apply operation is similar to a proposal in the context of the Gale / Shapley algorithm for SM [3] . These operations lead to provisional assignments between students, projects and lecturers; such assignments can subsequently be broken during the algorithm's execution. Also, throughout the execution, entries are possibly deleted from the preference lists of students, and from the projected preference lists of lecturers. We use the abbreviation delete the pair (s i , p j ) to denote the operation of deleting p j from the preference list of s i , and deleting s i from L j k , where l k is the lecturer who offers p j .
Initially all students are free, and all projects and lecturers are totally unsubscribed. As long as there is some student s i who is free and who has a non-empty assign each student to be free; assign each project and lecturer to be totally unsubscribed; while (some student si is free) and (si has a non-empty list) { pj = first project on si's list; l k = lecturer who offers pj; /* si applies to pj */ provisionally assign si to pj; /* and to l k */ if (pj is over-subscribed) { sr = worst student assigned to pj; /* according to L j k */ break provisional assignment between sr and pj; } else if (l k is over-subscribed) { sr = worst student assigned to l k ; pt = project assigned sr; break provisional assignment between sr and pt; } if (pj is full) { sr = worst student assigned to pj; /* according to
delete the pair (st, pu); } } Fig. 2 . Algorithm SPA-student for finding a student-optimal stable matching list, s i applies to the first project p j on his/her list. We let l k be the lecturer who offers p j . Immediately, s i becomes provisionally assigned to p j (and to l k ).
If p j is over-subscribed, then l k rejects the worst student s r assigned to p j . The pair (s r , p j ) will be deleted by the subsequent conditional that tests for p j being full. Similarly, if l k is over-subscribed, then l k rejects his/her worst assigned student s r . The pair (s r , p t ) will be deleted by either of the two subsequent conditionals, where p t was the project formerly assigned to s r .
Regardless of whether any rejections occurred as a result of the two situations described in the previous paragraph, we have two further (possibly non-disjoint) cases in which deletions may occur. If p j is full, we let s r be the worst student assigned to p j (according to L j k ) and delete the pair (s t , p j ) for each successor s t of s r on L j k . Similarly if l k is full, we let s r be the worst student assigned to l k , and delete the pair (s t , p u ) for each successor s t of s r on L k , and for each project p u offered by l k that s t finds acceptable.
The algorithm is described in pseudocode form in Figure 2 as Algorithm SPA-student. We will prove that, once the main loop terminates, the assigned pairs constitute a student-optimal stable matching.
Conclusions and open problems
In this paper we have presented a student-oriented algorithm for a SPA instance. This produces the student-optimal stable matching, in which each student obtains the best project that he/she could obtain in any stable matching. We remark that we have also formulated a lecturer-oriented counterpart, which we omit for space reasons. This second algorithm produces the lecturer-optimal stable matching, in which each lecturer obtains the best set of students that he/she could obtain in any stable matching.
A number of interesting open problems remain. These include:
-The SPA model may be extended to the case where lecturers have preferences over (student,project) pairs. However in this setting it is an open problem to formulate an acceptable stability definition that avoids issues of strategy. For example, a student could deliberately shorten his/her preference list in order to obtain a better project, rather than submitting his/her true preferences. These strategic issues are described in more detail in [1] .
-If we allow ties in the preference lists of students and lecturers, different stability definitions are possible. These can be obtained by extending stability definitions that have been applied to the Hospitals / Residents problem with Ties [5] . It remains open to construct algorithms for SPA where preference lists contain ties, under each of these stability criteria.
